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to environments with lower M&A activity just after their initial public offering (IPO) respond by engaging in
fewer technological acquisitions and more internal research. Interestingly, this adaptive reaction becomes
inertial shortly after IPO and persists well into maturity. The study advances our understanding of how the
environment shapes heterogeneity and capabilities through its impact on firm structure and accumulation
of resources. I discuss how these results can help bridge inertial versus adaptive perspectives in the
study of organizations, by documenting an instance when the two sequentially interact.
Managerial Summary: There has been much evidence to suggest that mature innovative firms tend to
have a preferred mode for accessing new technology: either by making it internally or buying it from other
firms. However, we do not know very well how firms develop these preferences. This paper investigates
how financial market conditions affect young firms around the time of going public, and shows that
recently IPO’d firms that experience depressed M&A markets go on to rely less on acquisitions when they
mature. Conversely, these firms seem to develop more technologies in-house. These findings suggest
that some early events in a firm’s life may have long-lasting consequences, which may be difficult to
change later.
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Abstract
Research Summary: Using novel data on 1,211 public firms, I show that innovative
organizations exposed to environments with lower M&A activity just after their initial
public offering (IPO) respond by engaging in fewer technological acquisitions and more
internal research. Interestingly, this adaptive reaction becomes inertial shortly after IPO
and persists well into maturity. The study advances our understanding of how the environment shapes heterogeneity and capabilities through its impact on firm structure and
accumulation of resources. I discuss how these results can help bridge inertial versus adaptive perspectives in the study of organizations, by documenting an instance when the two
sequentially interact.
Managerial Summary: There has been much evidence to suggest that mature innovative firms tend to have a preferred mode for accessing new technology: either by making
it internally or buying it from other firms. However, we do not know very well how firms
develop these preferences. This paper investigates how financial market conditions affect
young firms around the time of going public, and shows that recently IPO’d firms that
experience depressed M&A markets go on to rely less on acquisitions when they mature.
Conversely, these firms seem to develop more technologies in-house. These findings suggest
that some early events in a firm’s life may have long-lasting consequences, which may be
difficult to change later.
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INTRODUCTION
How does an organization’s unique past shape its future? A key assumption in modern strategy is that firm differences are important precisely because they at once enable and constrain
capabilities (Penrose, 1995). But we know little about how differences originate, evolve, and
persist (Cockburn et al., 2000; Siggelkow, 2011). Within the study of innovation in particular,
we know that firms often draw disproportionately on either internal and external sources for
technological inputs (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992), but why they may
favor one channel versus the other is unclear (Arora et al., 2014; Pisano, 1990).
This study contributes to our understanding of the origins of firm heterogeneity by showing
how the post-IPO environment influenced the divergent evolution of 1,211 technology firms,
towards either a more internal or external innovation strategy. I propose a mechanism that
may explain some of this divergence: Firms lack fully-developed routines and capabilities for
technology sourcing at their initial public offering (“IPO”), and begin favoring whichever method
is most efficient (either internal or external) given the prevailing environment. What is initially
a temporary response then persists because IPOs involve intense firm-level transformation and
high plasticity (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003), leading to structural
changes which are less responsive to subsequent environmental stresses (Stinchcombe, 1965).
While prior work has identified the early part of a firm’s history as a determinant of future
heterogeneous capabilities (Boeker, 1989; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Holbrook et al.,
2000), we still lack a coherent theory on how, when, and why firms are thus constrained by the
past. For example, there is evidence that firms cannot adapt after radically changed institutional
environments (Kogut and Zander, 2000), but on the other hand, firms often change after the
original founder leaves (Hannan et al., 1996). Similarly, while early work suggested that the link
between founding and persistence operates through cognitive mechanisms (Boeker, 1989), more
recent scholars argue that it is likely to involve multi-level interactions (Marquis and Tilcsik,
2013; Siggelkow, 2011), or through limiting the set of local optimization options (Levinthal,
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1997). Just as importantly, the literature is virtually silent on which of these mechanisms
are responsive to managerial intervention. Therefore, in this paper I look at just one specific
temporal setting (the post-IPO window) and one possible conditioning factor (the economic
environment), in order to focus the discussion and hopefully clarify and extend prior findings
of this diverse literature.
The propositions that environmental conditions during developmental milestones may explain long-run firm heterogeneity is tested by exploiting a series of seven shocks between 1975
and 2008 which created unfavorable environments for the acquisition of external technology. I
develop a novel dataset which details the ownership, financial, acquisition, and patenting history of all innovative firms that went public in this period, then measure the impact to firms
that faced (worse) periods for M&A after IPO. Because the post-IPO period is one of rapid
expansion(Bernstein, 2014), these shocks raised search and transaction costs for external technology at a time when firms would normally seek aggressive growth via acquisitions (Celikyurt
and Sevilir, 2010). Conversely, because newly-public firms still need to find sources of growth,
decreased acquisition opportunities should increase their effort and investment on internal development, given the relatively lower cost of internal research vs. acquisition of external technology
(Stiglitz, 2000).
Importantly, innovation is characterized by lags between inputs and outputs, uncertainty,
and imperfect appropriability (Arrow, 1962b; Cohen et al., 2000), and thus innovative firms
are quite prone to path-dependency and inertial forces, which might make these early decisions
hard to change later. Therefore I argue we should expect enduring differences in firms’ future
corporate strategy mix of business development/external acquisition vs. organic R&D, as a
result of their early environment. In other words, the timing of IPO might partially explain
why some firms end up being more “makers” or “buyers” of technology.
While this might seem a straightforward argument, its empirical study faces considerable
identification problems. After all, firms not only decide to go public, they also pick the exact
date of their IPO, thus self-selecting into the early economic environment they face (Ritter
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and Welch, 2002). At the same time, firms may be inherently different pre-IPO, or even since
founding–in other words, firms have “pre-histories,” inherited from the histories of their founders
(Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). For example most firms go public during IPO waves, when the
financial markets are robust, yet other firms chose to go public during recessionary periods. In
either case, potential self selection and endogeneity makes it difficult to identify the role played
by the post-IPO environment on future firm characteristics.
I employ two strategies to mitigate these concerns. First, I develop a detailed dataset on key
characteristics of the sample firms, including novel matched and hand-collected data on their preand post-IPO patent applications, inventors, and regulatory filings. The information contained
in their SEC S-1 filings is particularly useful, as it discloses both their pre-IPO experience in
acquisitions, but also their intentions to pursue acquisitions as part of their long-term strategy.
After all, a key worry is that the heterogeneity we measure at maturity is the manifestation of
early differences, rather then the outcome of exposure to different environments at IPO.
Second, private firms or those that IPO during recessions might nonetheless be different
in unobservable ways, and may still self-select to IPO during more (less) munificent times for
M&A. Therefore I employ a quasi-experimental setting which exploits unpredictability in the
length of corporate event waves (Harford, 2005). I restrict the sample to firms that went public
and which did so during the seven active IPO waves that ended suddenly. This allows me to
focus on firms that went public into similar environments, but then faced different economic
conditions after the IPO.1 Thus, while firms self-select to go public during an active period,
they do not know if they will enjoy a long period of robust economic activity as newly-minted
public firms (I call this control group the “early” firm) or whether they will face unexpectedly
dampened capital and M&A markets (the “late” firms).
My main results provide strong evidence of the long-run persistence of temporal shocks:
Firms exposed to fewer acquisition opportunities just after an IPO (the “late” firms) engage in
1

As I explain in the Empirical Methodology section the only identifying assumption needed is that firms do
not know ex ante if they are going public close to the end of a wave. Because wave lengths vary from nine
months to 3.5 years and end unexpectedly, this is a reasonable assumption. Nonetheless, I exclude firms at the
very beginning and end of waves, to mitigate the concern that some firms expect the end to be near.
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up to 30% lower acquisition intensity even 25 years later. Conversely, late firms also demonstrate
higher levels of internal research, as reflected by patent-level measures. I also find differences
in top management teams. Late firms have more science PhDs and fewer MBAs, which is
consistent with more internal research and less acquisition activity. These findings support the
view that the mechanism at work may involve the adaptation of firms’ whole set of activities. In
other words, lack of early acquisition experience does not just decrease acquisition capabilities,
but also seems to increase substitute activities. Interestingly, I find little difference in terms of
financial performance between treated and control groups, suggesting that firms adapt quickly
given their initial post-IPO environments.
Taken together, my findings partly bridge some of the tension between adaptation and
selection theories of firm evolution (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Levinthal, 1997), suggesting a
brief period of adaptation after IPO followed by long-run inertia.

Theory and background
Adaptation and inertia in technology sourcing
Most firms are unable to efficiently generate all the technology they need (Arrow, 1962a),
and therefore complement internal R&D (“make”) with externally sourced technology (“buy”)
(Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Granstrand and Sjölander, 1990). In this sub-section, I highlight
the inertial nature of these activities. Both make and buy should require tacit organizational
know-how developed over time, as it is unlikely that firms can quickly become good at either
activity.
With regards to make, it is well accepted that a firm’s ability to perform internal research is
closely related to complementary activities, takes time to accumulate, and that once mastered,
it can provide competitive advantage (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Henderson and Cockburn,
1994). With regards to buy, however, the issue is not as obvious. While buying is sometimes
characterized as a faster or more nimble way of acquiring resources (Higgins and Rodriguez,
2006; Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Puranam et al., 2006), successful buying and integration are

Early environment and innovation strategy

5

also notoriously tacit and hard to master processes (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Haspeslagh
and Jemison, 1991).2
A recurring problem in studying the value-creation of acquisitions comes from the fact that
some firms buy often and are good at it, while others simply pursue different channels for
accessing new resources (Graebner et al., 2010; Laamanen and Keil, 2008). Thus, I point out
that the ability to acquire well should itself be heterogeneous, cumulative and path-dependent.
These buy capabilities likely reside at the organizational level, accumulate over time, and interact
recursively with make capabilities to perform internal research (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
For example, as noted in detailed studies of Lycos and Vanguard, these firms became good at
acquiring after a period of trial-and-error (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007; Siggelkow, 2002), which
involved several organizational readjustments. Summarizing the foregoing discussion, buy is
somewhat of a paradox in that it is an activity that when well-honed allows the firm to adapt,
but is itself resistant to adaptation by virtue of its own inertial pressures. Google, for example,
has sourced almost all of its new products from acquisitions, but it learned how to acquire well
by doing it early, while it was still a malleable firm. As David Lawee, Google’s Director of
Acquisitions, put it in 2012:
“Integration is a really well-honed process now, I certainly wouldn’t have said that
four years ago. Four years ago we could get away with, You are smart, figure it out,
because it was a smaller business” 3
This raises an interesting question, which motivates the present study: if technological buy
capabilities must be learned, and in such regard are similar to make capabilities, what happens
to firms that have fewer opportunities to buy during key formative stages? I propose that
post-IPO firms have not yet developed either type of capability fully, and will begin growing via
whichever method is most efficient given the prevailing environment. But since make and buy
are at least partial substitutes (Arora et al., 2014), increasing reliance on one channel should
2
These challenges in integrating acquisitions buttress the widely-held view that acquisitions either do not
create value (Hitt et al., 1996), or only do so given very specific contingencies (Ahuja and Katila, 2001).
3
http://www.xconomy.com/san-francisco/2012/03/05/googles-rules-of-acquisition-how-to-be-an-androidnot-an-aardvark/
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result in decreasing reliance on the other. In other words, once a firm begins on a path to
acquire often, it will not only get good at external sourcing, but it may also under-develop
internal research capabilities. Thus, their initial vertical integration choices as public firms
(with new resources and pressures) would be strongly conditioned by the environment, based
on the prevailing market and technological considerations (Gans et al., 2002; Pisano, 1990).
These early choices should result in the persistent favoring of one or another set of capabilities through the path-dependency of technology and accumulation of capabilities, routines
and structures (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Siggelkow, 2011). In turn, such divergence should
amplify to make future choices less conditioned by the environment and more conditioned by
accumulated experience and abilities. In other words, their early environment might arbitrarily
determine a firm’s future reliance on a make or buy mode of growth, and lead to heterogeneous
strategies at the population level.
Much theory and evidence support the view that inertial pressures can perpetuate patterns
that develop during critical periods of a firm’s history. As firms become enmeshed in the complex
interdependencies of both internal and external activities (Boeker, 1989; Kimberly, 1975), the
idiosyncratic webs of specific investments themselves become both the firm’s critical resources
(Zingales, 2000), and the organizational “genes” that persist even as the organization grows and
changes (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Interdependencies of this sort have been conceptualized
under various constructs, such as interactions (Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2006) or “organizational
activity patterns” (Romanelli and Tushman, 1986). In general, theoretical perspectives agree
that the relationships among multiple dimensions of organizational activity: e.g., strategy, structure, political processes, norms, should be inertial by virtue of their intrinsic organization, above
and beyond any deliberate managerial volition.
Consistent with such a view, many well-known firms such as Cisco Systems, Illinois Toolworks, Google, and Johnson & Johnson persistently gravitate towards the external channel. On
the other hand, firms like Apple and IBM engage in considerably fewer acquisitions relative
to their internal research efforts. Recent work has provided large-scale evidence that in fact
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most firms heavily favor either internal or external technology, and that a firm’s orientation is
highly persistent and related to organizational structure. Arora et al. (2014), for example while
agnostic about causality, strongly supports the view that firm-specific heterogeneity is related
to the mutually reinforcing patterns of internal and external innovative activity.
But where do these divergent trajectories originate? There are many views on why events
from the past influence a firm’s present structure and conduct. Much work fits loosely under
the umbrella of the founding/founder effects or imprinting literatures. For example, at the
firm level, jobs and occupations, capabilities, and routines may reflect the conditions that were
prevalent at their creation (Beckman and Burton, 2008). On the other hand, at the individual
level, workers’ early and prior experiences both enable and constrain the range of their choices
in the long run, even after changes in employment (Azoulay et al., 2009).4
My study differs from the aforementioned streams by looking at a critical juncture that comes
years after founding: the IPO. This setting lets me explore the interplay between adaptation
and inertia during an interesting window when the firm is on the cusp of maturity, but also
still changing. An important difference between an IPO and a founding setting is that the
survival rate for firms post IPO is much higher that that of new ventures. For example, studies
by the Federal Reserve of New York find that 80% of IPOs make it past their 7th anniversary
(Peristiani and Hong, 2004), while the literature on entrepreneurship has documented survival
rates of about 40% for new ventures (Headd, 2003). This means that firms going public are less
sensitive to the population ecology mechanisms (e.g., liability of newness, resource constraints)
often associated with imprinting theories (Stinchcombe, 1965), and thus less driven by culling
effects and survival (which tend towards homogeneity, rather than explaining heterogeneity).
Summarizing the foregoing, my paper provides one explanation for the divergence along
the internal/external divide in innovation strategy. As I more fully describe in the empirical
section, I compare young, newly public firms faced with better (worse) opportunities to grow
by acquisition just after their IPO. Then I observe them for several years and measure whether
these initial conditions increased (decreased) the frequency of future buy decisions.
4

See Marquis and Tilcsik (2013) for a thorough review of the literature.
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My setting allows us to better isolate a link between the economic environment and the
evolution of the firm, just after crossing a major survival milestone and at a considerable distance
from the founder’s original “blueprints” (Hannan et al., 1996).
IPOs and plasticity
Given the empirical setting which focuses on IPOs as a critical point in the divergence of technological orientation, some discussion of certain relevant features of this period are warranted.
IPOs change core features of the organization’s processes and structures at many levels, rendering the firm more plastic (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). At one level, the ownership of the
firm changes from concentrated to diluted, disrupting prior relational contracts, internal political structures, and incentive systems. More directly, going public often results in changes in
management, as founder-CEO’s give up some control, external professional managers come in,
and early participants cash out (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003). As I describe in the next section,
one possible observable of such changes would be the educational background of top managers.
Specifically, I look at the number of MBAs and PhDs in positions of leadership. I argue the
MBA managers would be more useful to an acquisitive firm, whereas PhDs would be more useful
to a more research-oriented firm.
A growing body of work within the finance literature has also documented that firms become
heavy acquirers just after going public.5 An IPO eases liquidity constraints, increases legitimacy,
and rewards growth. For example, Celikyurt and Sevilir (2010) found that pior to IPO, only 19%
of firms had made any acquisitions, but that the figure jumped to 74% within 5 years of IPO.
Relatedly, Arikan and McGahan (2010) find evidence supportive of the view that some (but not
all) firms begin to engage in “programs of acquisitions” shortly after IPO, yet acknowledge that
we still don’t know what drives these patterns. My core argument is that not all firms respond
to IPO in the same way, and that the environment may drive some of the divergence.
Finally, stricter reporting and regulation requirements, combined with pressure from investors seeking grow, might change the goals of the firm. For innovative firms, it has been
5

See Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) for a review of the literature.
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argued that this would reduce the incentives to pursue more uncertain or longer-term projects
in favor of projects with shorter horizons and less variance. Of particular relevancy to my paper, such pressure against internal development might have countervailing positive effect on the
firm’s search for external technologies. In line with this view, Bernstein (2014) not only found
that IPOs increased M&A activity by 300% among patenting firms, but also that going public
led to less basic research. His paper is closely related to my study, since we both look at how
IPO increases acquisitions and decreases research. However, while prior evidence documented
the mean effect for all firms that go public (comparing public to non-public) I go on to show
that the effects of IPO are not uniform for all public firms.
*INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE*
As I discuss in the next section, depending on a firm’s position in the wave, these changes can
move in opposite directions, and seem to be driven by the environmental conditions facing the
firm after IPO. Figure 1 shows a simple illustration of prior findings on the average impact of IPO
on the ration of internal/external technology, while Figure 2 shows my proposed decomposition
of the response to IPO in response to different external conditions.

EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
This quasi-experimental study tests whether going public in the later half of an IPO cycle causes
firms to engage in fewer technological acquisitions (Ahuja and Katila, 2001) but more original
research, not just on the heels of the IPO, but also into maturity. In the next section I discuss
the identification strategy, and how I am able to characterize two discrete types of exogenous
economic environments (favorable/unfavorable for technological acquisitions).
Identification strategy
I classify firms as early or late, depending on whether they go public on the first or second
half of an IPO wave. I then test for the impact of environmental conditions that make it less

Early environment and innovation strategy

10

efficient/desirable to access external technologies. I exploit two regularities that have been welldocumented in the finance literature. First, IPOs come in waves which begin and end suddenly
and unpredictably (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Second, the end of an IPO wave usually comes
due to a macroeconomic shock that also brings about conditions unfavorable for acquisitions
(Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996).6 Thus, building on much work in the economics of information,
I argue that periods of slow economic activity should result in increased search costs for firms
seeking technological assets in the market for firms Arrow (1974); Stigler (1961).
While it is beyond the scope of my paper to weigh competing explanations for such persistent
correlations, we can make two assertions: First, there is no reason to believe that firms can
reliably predict the end an IPO wave or an M&A at the time of going public, since waves
come to an end due to macroeconomic shocks. Second, and most important: for all the periods
under observation, IPO activity (the criteria used to assign treatment and control groups) and
technological acquisition activity (the mechanism I argue should drive the divergence), both
essentially shut down at the same time. Figure 3 plots the 1999-2000 wave, showing that IPO
activity and volume of small technological acquisitions are highly co-temporal.
*INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE*
The dark line represents the monthly volume of IPOs, while the shaded area below represents
the volume of technological acquisitions completed by public firms under 5 years old. As more
fully described in the Data section, technological acquisitions involve targets that hold at least
one self-generated patent, and which are no more than 50% as large as the acquirer in terms of
assets and patents held. All waves in the period of study follow the same pattern, consistent
with the findings of a robust empirical literature showing that IPO and M&A waves are highly
correlated with each other and to broader economic trends. For example, Lowry et al. (2010)
focuses on IPOs, while (RhodesKropf et al., 2005) analyze merger waves and their correlation
to broader macroeconomic patterns such as corporate valuations and GDP. A second relevant
finding in the finance literature is that waves end unexpectedly. Brealey and Myers (2003),
6

See also Stiglitz (2000) for a discussion of how fluctuations in financial markets affect investment decisions,
especially for R&D intensive firms
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for example, call the existence of these “financial fashions” an important unsolved puzzle for
corporate finance.
*INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE*
There are seven such waves between 1975 and 2009, resulting in seven treatment/control cohorts.
Figure 4 illustrates the temporal relationship between the dependent and independent variables.
Acquisitions in future (DV ) at top and position within IPO wave (IV) at bottom. I assign firms
to treatment groups if their IPO was after the midpoint in their respective IPO wave. Conversely,
firms that went public before the midpoint are coded as control. For ease of exposition, I refer to
treated firms as LATE firms for the remainder of the paper. I refer to control firms as EARLY.
The identification approach is important because firms pick the exact date of their IPO, so
they choose the type of economic environment in which they go public (Ritter and Welch, 2002).
Such self-selection makes it difficult to untangle the role played by the environment (versus unobserved heterogeneity) on future characteristics. My quasi-experimental design approximates
randomization since firms do not know if they will enjoy a long or short wave (Harford, 2005).
Consequently, at the moment of IPO, they do not know how close they are to the shock that
brings about a dampened acquisitions market.

DATA
Information on IPOs comes from Jay Ritter at the University of Florida.7 I use his data on
IPO volume per month to demarcate the beginning and end of the IPO waves. I supplement his
data on dates of incorporation for the firms with COMPUSTAT and BvD data (the corrections
are minor). I also use his data on first day returns (underpricing) as controls in my regressions.
I construct an inventory of patents, inventors, firm structure, and M&A activity for almost
all firms traded in major global stock exchanges. My paper combines data from several sources:
(i) patent-level information from the EPOs PATSTAT database; (ii) ownership structure data
from ORBIS by Bureau vanDjik (BvD); (iii) merger and acquisition data from Thomson Reuters
7

http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm
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SDC Platinum and Zephyr by BvD; (iv) scientific publications data from Thomson’s ISI Web
of Knowledge; (v) S-1 Regulatory filings from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC);
and (vi) accounting information from COMPUSTAT.
In order to mitigate the concern that firms have differential pre-IPO orientation in terms of
internal vs. external technology strategy, a team of researchers read the full S-1 filings for over
half of the sample. We were limited in the number of forms we could get online, but nonetheless
collected 620 full forms from the SEC. Each form was read by two people, and coded for firms’
prior M&A experience and mentions of whether acquisitions played a part of their pre or post
IPO strategy. Details of the coding and methodology can be found on Appendix C.
The dataset also leverages the massive efforts of the European Patent Office (EPO), which
has over several years developed the PATSTAT relational database.8 This is a snapshot of
the EPO master documentation database (DOCDB) with worldwide coverage, containing 20
tables including bibliographic data, citations and patent family links. Reassignment data from
PATSTAT is also used to trace the complete history of every patent and ascertain whether it
was kept by the original inventing firm or transferred. Thus, I am able to exploit the complete
portfolio of patents held by and invented by firms as well as observe the entire history of each
patent.
A major advantage of using PATSTAT over resources like the NBER or HBS patent databases
(Hall et al., 2001; Li et al., 2011) lies in the fact that PATSTAT includes the global scope of all
applications and priority family relationships. My study looks at the acquisition of technology
which is often held by small private and/or foreign firms, and these legal entities are hard to find
in competing patent databases. Small private firms often change names, and their pending applications can be granted to the acquiring firm, which destroys the evidence of who the original
applicant was. This has hampered earlier efforts to trace the sources of external technology.9
8

https://www.epo.org/searching-for-patents/business/patstat.html
For example, the patents behind Google’s Picasa technology would seem to have been generated by Google,
according to traditional databases. This is because Google appears as the first assignee both on the original
patent and in the USPTO assignment database. However, the original applications for this technology were filed
by Michael Herf, the entrepreneur and founder of Picasa, Inc., a company which Google bought and absorbed
in 2006 prior to any of Herf’s patents being granted. Such cases of IP transfer in the period between application
and grant are actually rather frequent, as documented by Gans et al. (2008) in the context of licensing, and lead
9
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Another important advantage of my data comes from using the Bureau vanDjik (BvD)
database10 to map firm structure for the sample firms. Many firms have complex corporate
structures which makes it difficult to draw the boundaries of the firm. For example, within
the same firm, some patents may be assigned to headquarters or to wholly-owned subsidiaries.
That means that even with perfect matching of assignee to corporate entity, we may still miss
the “real” owner of a patent. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., for example, has a very decentralized
structure where wholly-owned subsidiaries retain title to patents. Such structures under-count
the patent portfolios for many firms. Most importantly, it introduces more than just simple
measurement error, since it has been shown that the decision to centralize or decentralize patent
assignment is strongly correlated with firm structure and innovation strategy (Arora et al., 2014)
My final set matches all patents, applications, and reassignments between 1950 and 2014
for publicly traded US firms, their wholly owned subsidiaries, or their acquisition targets. This
allows me to capture all pre-IPO patenting activity performed by firms, up to 25 years prior to
the first IPO in the sample. I match firms to patents by starting with the raw match provided
by BVD, and refining the data using a number of original routines. However, it is important
to note that the raw data from BvD is still in the beta trial stage, and required considerable
adjustment. In order to clarify ownership, I used the PATSTAT’s legal event database to verify
ownership of each patent. I found that BvD required corrections for about 35% for the whole
sample, and as much as 70% for smaller firms, some of which are completely missed by BVD.
Corporate ownership structure and transaction data consists of three parts: cross-sectional
ownership information from BvD for 2013; M&A data from SDC Platinum and BvD’s Zephyr
product; and reassignment data from USPTO and PATSTAT.
*INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE*
Ultimately, the extensive matching of patents to firms is necessary to identify proper technological acquisitions. The importance of a detailed inventory of patents for both acquirers and
to underreporting the scope of external technology. Thus, in constructing my dataset, I paid particular attention
to linking patent priority families to inventors, start-ups, and ultimate acquirers, (rather than treating patents
as discrete quanta) to trace these hidden transfers.
10
http://www.bvdinfo.com
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targets has been emphasized by prior studies (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Higgins and Rodriguez,
2006), and to date a majority of studies looking strictly at technological acquisitions have exploited small samples. Whereas firms might buy targets for a variety of reasons (e.g., market
share, vertical integration, talent) my arguments about the balance between internal and external technology requires that we look only at acquisitions which can substitute for internal
research. For similar reasons, I only look at targets which can be thought of as inputs. Clearly,
a lateral merger among equals would be beyond of the scope of our discussion, and may change
the firm in a number of ways not contemplated here. Thus, I limit targets to firms that are no
larger than 50% the size of the acquirer, both in terms of patents and assets held. In all, my
sample includes 5,835 acquisitions over the period 1985-2013.

RESULTS
IPO timing and technological orientation
Before presenting parametric tests, it is useful to look at a striking pattern in the raw data.
Figure 5 shows the stark difference in average external orientation between early and late firms.
The graph shows a plot of the average share of external patents (that is, what portion of a firm’s
monthly flow of patents were sourced via a technological acquisition). On the vertical axis, we
have the percentage share average for early and late firms. I equalize time periods so that we
can look at all firms in relation to their IPO date, which takes a value of 0 on the horizontal
axis.
*INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE*
This allows us to see how the trends in patenting for early and late firms compare both before
and after going public. We can see that before IPO (value 0 on horizontal axis), both early
and late firms have very similar shares, about ten percent. However, the dashed line shows that
going public creates a sharp jump in the external ratio for early firms. On the other hand, the
solid line shows how for late firms an IPO has a negligible effect on the firms’ pre-existing trend
in share of externally acquired patents.
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Parametric evidence. I am interested in measuring the differences between treated firms,
for whom the main explanatory binary variable LATE takes the value of 1, and the control group,
for whom LATE takes a value of 0. The main prediction here is that we should expect to see
late firms engage in fewer technological acquisitions in the long-run, and that these differences
will due solely to the timing of their IPO. Table 3 begins to explore the relationship between
LATE and the number of small technological acquisitions that each firm made by looking at the
period between years 5 and 10 after IPO. In later tests I will explore for persistence, however
here I concentrate on seeing how the relationships between LATE and acquisitions respond to
different controls.
On Column 1 we see that firms on average make just over four such acquisitions.11 Given that
the dependent variable is a count of completed acquisitions, which likely exhibits overdispersion,
I explore the treatment effect of going public on the second half of a wave by using variations of a
negative binomial specification (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). All specifications include controls
for pre-IPO firm characteristics such as size, number of patents, and S-1 form information, as
well as industry code dummies and individual wave dummies (so that we capture the withinwave, and within industry variation only).
Incidence ratios on Column 1 show that LATE firms acquire only 67.24% as many technological targets, relative to early firms. Column 2 includes controls for pre-IPO patenting
characteristics. I include measures for the average originality, generality, and non-patent references of the stock of patents held prior to IPO. These are measures that capture the quality of a
firm’s research. Including these controls further reduces the ratio of LATE /EARLY to 60.79%,
which goes against the possibility that the differences between early and LATE are driven by
differences in pre-IPO technological capabilities.

Column 3 shows a slight attenuation once

we include firm-level characteristics such as assets, employees, and sales measured at maturity.
This makes sense, as firms likely diverge in business and strategic orientations in addition to
related to their acquisition activity
11

This is consistent with Celikyurt and Sevilir (2010), who report the number to be 4.3 acquisitions in the
first 5 years post IPO.
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*INSERT TABLE 3 HERE*
I also look at whether the LATE dummy predicts a firm’s acquisition rate in the long run.
Because firms generally become larger and more acquisitive with age, counts may be harder
to interpret. Instead, I compare the ratio of LATE firms to early firms that are in the top
quartile of M&A volume for each wave, and within a 5-year moving window that begins on
the year of IPO. Looking at quartiles thus helps us see the impact of IPO timing in terms of
how likely a firm is to be among the top acquirers for a cohort. In Table 4, Column 1 shows
the effect for firms up to five years post-IPO. Using a moving 5-year window, the magnitude of
the negative coefficient on LATE decreases slightly as we move across Columns 2-5. Incidence
ratios (IRR) are reported and range from 66.92% in years 1-5 to 74.44% in years 15-20. This
shows that the differences between early and LATE firms remains quite steady over time, albeit
with a slight trend toward convergence. In other words, LATE firms engage in about a third
to a quarter fewer technological acquisitions over their life. Not surprisingly, the statistical
significance begins to drop as the sample becomes smaller, thus, by Column 5 we only have
171 firms and the standard errors are slightly larger. These results provide strong evidence of
long-run persistence for the impact of LATE on future technological acquisitions. However, the
slight attenuating of the impact does not support the view that differences amplify over time.
*INSERT TABLE 4 HERE*
Evidence of adaptation or selection
The foregoing results have shown that firms exposed to environments unfavorable for acquisitions just after their IPO are roughly 30% less likely to engage in this kind of deal even after
they mature. However, the finding could mean different things. Since technological acquisitions
are important for firms to access resources, it could mean that LATE firms are simply unlucky,
at a disadvantage in terms of acquiring technology, and would exhibit lower performance and
survival. This would be consistent with a population ecology view. Alternatively, and according
to the arguments presented here, it could be that firms facing times of slim acquisition oppor-
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tunities might compensate by developing better internal research capabilities. In the next three
tables, I explore these two scenarios.
Differences in performance and survival. What is the impact of LATE on survival
and performance? Interestingly, I find that there is no impact per se of the LATE dummy.
In unreported results, a series of tests (using OLS, Negative binomial, and Probit) failed to
find statistically significant correlations between LATE and measures for sales, sales growth, or
return on assets at maturity. These findings do not support the view that “unlucky” firms were
more likely to be selected out. Firms that go late might look and act very differently in terms
of their patenting and acquisitions (as shown in the prior results), but this seems an adaptive
response, since these differences do not impact their outcomes.
Differences in proxies for internal research. I explore the impact of LATE on patentlevel proxies for more basic research. Originality, generality, and references to non-scientific
literature (NPL) are widely accepted measures that reflect the degree to which a firm engages
in more fundamental versus incremental research (Hall et al., 2005). Table 5 shows that LATE
is associated with a significant increase in non-patent references (NPL). We see similar results
for generality and originality. These regressions are OLS with a full gamut of controls for
pre and post IPO characteristics. Note that whereas the association between acquisitions just
after IPO and acquisitions later in life is relatively intuitive, and consistent with learning and
resource accumulation theories, for us to find divergence in terms of type of research performed
is strongly supportive of a more complicated adaptive view.
Put simply, it seems that firms which might appear “unlucky” at first (having gone public
close to an economic slowdown), actually manage to compensate by developing better internal
research capabilities. It is important to note that I do not measure capabilities, but rather
measure proxies for research effort. However, to putting these findings on research effort together
with the findings on performance suggests that the LATE firms have developed better research
capabilities. Otherwise, it would be hard to explain their ability to be economically on par with
early firms, while doing fewer technological acquisitions and spending more effort on research.
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*INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE*
While the main tests in the paper split firms into early and late based on their position within
a wave, the core argument is that the shock comes at the end of the wave. If this is the case,
we should expect that the temporal “distance” from the end of each wave should be correlated
with our variables of interest. To check, I run the exact same regressions as in Table 5, while
replacing the LATE dummy with a count measure of how many months between a firm’s IPO
and the end of its wave. As Table 6 shows, the results are very similar.
Mechanism
Differences in top management. I proceed by exploring potential mechanisms under-girding
these patterns. Prior studied have shown that managers can be one locus of persistence in
organizations. For example, seminal work in imprinting has shown founders bring organizational
“blueprints” become part of the firm’s core structure (Hannan et al., 1996), but that these
effects may attenuate over time. More recently the focus has shifted to exploring whether top
managers can be important factors in determining a firm’s ability to change and adapt via
sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring Helfat and Peteraf (2015) However there is not much known
about how the environment shapes the firm’s management post-founding, as the founder’s
influence fades. Thus, I explore whether IPO timing is also related to the composition of top
management. The logic is that a firm should have consistent supporting structures for its sets
of activities (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Siggelkow, 2011), and that management is part
of this structure. If firms develop external(internal) capabilities, then we should expect their
management to reflect the firm’s orientation. I explore the impact of LATE on the composition
of top management at maturity. I measure top management for firms between 5 and 10 years
of age as of 2013, and include the educational background of its managers as observed 2013.
Data limitations prevent me from observing educational background across moving windows, as
in the acquisition analysis.
I perform negative binomial regressions to look for differences in education of top manage-

Early environment and innovation strategy

19

ment. Table 7 shows the impact of the LATE dummy on the characteristics of top management
as of 2013. The dependent variable is a count of how many top managers had either an MBA
(Column 1 ) or a PhD in a scientific field (Column 2 ). I measure top management for each
firm during the window between 5 and 10 years post IPO. Coefficient estimates for negative
binomial regressions are exponentiated and reported here as incidence ratios. For managers of
a given type (MBA or PhD), incidence ratios reported can be interpreted as the ratio of: count
of managers for early firms/count of managers for late firms. Column 1 shows that LATE firms
have only 33.4% as many MBA managers relative to early firms. On the other hand, Column 2
shows that LATE firms have a 34.7% more managers with a science or engineering PhD relative
to early firms.
*INSERT TABLE 7 HERE*
Robustness tests. Despite the argument that firms cannot know their place within a wave
ex ante, it is still possible that some omitted variable drives some firms to be quicker to go
public within a wave, and that this is also correlated with future orientation. To mitigate this
concern, I run Probit tests for selection on several observed characteristics of both the firms
themselves (pre-IPO, including S-1 characteristics) and their patents (pre-IPO). As shown in
Table 8, I find no difference in terms of non-patent citations (a standard measure of scientific
orientation and basicness), originality, or generality. This suggests that firms in the sample were
not systematically different between treatment and control groups.
In unreported specifications, I also check the robustness of my results by restricting the
sample to exclude firms that went public in the first and last 2 months of a Wave, in order to
mitigate concerns that firms have private information that allow them to predict the beginning
or end of waves. Results are not much different for these specifications, however the standard
errors are larger in some coefficients due to smaller sample sizes. I also systematically exclude
individual waves from the analysis in all main specifications to ensure that no single wave is
driving the results. This is largely a redundant test, since the specifications already capture
within-wave variation through wave dummies. Removing individual waves has no effect.
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*INSERT TABLE 8 HERE*

DISCUSSION
Theoretical Implications. Technological innovation is prima facie economically important
(Schumpeter, 1942), it takes time to master (Arrow, 1962b), and it exhibits strong pathdependency (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Not surprisingly, it has been a key empirical setting
for thinking about organizational evolution and capabilities. Within strategy, a core tension in
innovation is the extent to which current capabilities allow a firm to compete, but may also hinder the exploration of future technological solutions (Christensen, 1997; Katila, 2002; Levitt and
March, 1988). Firms buy external knowledge to complement their internal efforts while selling
or licensing technology that cannot be optimally exploited internally (Arora and Gambardella,
1994; Granstrand and Sjölander, 1990). Much work in the innovation literature exploring these
dynamics has focused on how attributes of the technology (e.g., appropriability and patentability), as well as institutional and market conditions, influence entrants’ and incumbents’ decision
to compete through internal development or cooperate via acquisition (Arora et al., 2001; Cohen
et al., 2000).
However, the transaction-oriented branch of the innovation literature has largely side-stepped
issues of persistent firm differences. While firm differences are sometimes discussed in this
literature, they are generally treated as orthogonal to the core arguments. For example some
explicitly assume “memoryless” R&D investments and firms that can symmetrically increase or
decrease their R&D bargaining power (Gans and Stern, 2000). Similarly within this vein Arora
et al. (2001) acknowledge that absorptive capacity, not invented here, and similar firm-specific
constructs should interact with markets for technology, though these are never included in their
formal models. In other words, it is assumed that all firms come to the same decision (e.g.,
make or buy) given the same set of technological and market circumstances, and that having
made a decision, firms do not face significant barriers to implementation.
In contrast to the transaction-oriented view, the resource-based view on innovation focuses on
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the accumulation of firm-specific idiosyncratic experiences and capabilities over time (Penrose,
1995). For example, regular investments in R&D have been shown to increase firms’ ability to
access and integrate external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), and there is evidence that
competencies arise through experience and reside in the hard-to-change organizational structure
of the firm (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). This is a type of “memory” effect, and we should
expect that more mature firms would be less responsive to exogenous factors (e.g., nature of
technology and institutional environment) in their make/buy calculus. In other words, these
firms are subject to inertial pressures that limit their ability to adapt to the environment.
In this paper I have argued that innovative firms develop their technological orientation
through a sequential process of transaction and resource accumulation mechanisms, and that
the importance of these varies depending on the life stage of the firm. During times of change,
such as IPO, transaction mechanisms orient the firm to the environment. After that, resource
accumulation mechanisms maintain a degree of inertia. While recent theoretical arguments have
identified the need for such cross-framework integration (Argyres, 2011), to my knowledge this
is the first large-scale empirical study to undertake such an endeavor.
Beyond the field of innovation, the interdisciplinary implications of my paper are also significant. There are divergent views on what founding and imprinting literatures are, and my paper
does not seek to map perfectly with any of them. Nonetheless, my results should contribute to
many of these streams, by showing large-scale evidence consistent with the imprinting hypothesis, but occurring in a non-founding setting. Furthermore, within the context of imprinting
and founding conditions, the inertial view has been brought to bear to argue that a one-shot
luck of the draw at founding might determine survival or failure Stinchcombe (2000). However,
expanding concepts like imprinting to include subsequent periods of alternating plasticity and
ossification allows for a more nuanced view, where adaptation and inertia can take turns charting a firm’s path. Such reconciliation can help us bridge some potentially false dichotomies
across disciplines. After all, even Hannan and Freeman’s population ecology manifesto (1977),
often seen as the antithesis to strategic management’s faith in managerial volition, admits that:
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“a complete theory of organization and environment would have to consider both
adaptation and selection, recognizing that they are complementary processes.”
Managerial Implications. My findings are also informative to managers, who must constantly
“discriminate between what is and is not controllable” (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2004; Winter,
1987). In this regard, the present study is helpful in guiding organizational self-awareness. For
example, firms that ramp up in times of depressed acquisition markets may have internal obstacles to overcome along the way of implementing an acquisition strategy, such as entrenched roles
and compensation structures that reward internal development. These may not be responsive
to a top-down decree to change strategy.
From the perspective of younger firms, my findings could inform decisions about IPO timing
and how to nimbly respond to reversals in capital markets. For example, while I looked only
at firms going public during waves, my findings could be useful for firms considering an IPO
during a non-wave period. If a firm has particularly strong internal research opportunities, then
an off-wave IPO may be desirable. Finally, IPOs are not the only process that can disrupt core
features of the organization. Mergers and demergers, when large enough, might also make firms
plastic. Therefore, firms undergoing such transformations may need to consider the economic
environment as it may have unintended effects on the direction of a firm’s growth after a
transformative event.

CONCLUSION
This study has shown that the timing of IPO mattered for the population of firms that went
public between 1975 and 2008. Firms that went late during waves in this period engaged
in fewer technological acquisitions in the long run, and engaged in more internal research.
The econometric tests sought to mitigate concerns about selection, and it is argued that the
observed differences among late firms was due to their exposure to less opportunities to grow
via technological acquisitions in the period after going public.
I thus provided strong evidence of how quickly firms might cement their technological orientation. Such brief but important sensitive periods call for future work into the conditions under
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which inertia and adaptation interact. Theoretically, my paper draws on economics, finance,
RBV and evolutionary theory, and thus highlights the value of drawing on literatures that do
not often speak to each other. From an innovation perspective, my paper paper builds on recent
work that has shown persistence heterogeneity in organization of R&D, and suggests a potential
mechanism behind the empirical findings.
There are likely other punctuated windows that we should be looking at. Mergers and acquisitions in particular, can be transformative events, and future work should look at similar
windows, for example succession after founder exit or bankruptcy. While it may be uncontroversial to suggest that past events would affect future performance and organization characteristics,
there has been surprisingly little empirical evidence to document how and when such a thing
actually occurs. Thus, my paper makes two novel contributions. First, by focusing on a window
of time during which firms are still evolving, but which is removed from their actual founding,
it isolates the role of the environment from potential confounds, such as founder effects. Second, it shows that the window after IPO is a very sensitive period during which firms adapt to
the environment, and that once this short window closes, very strong inertia takes over. The
impact is empirically shown by the stark difference among firms which experienced differences
in exposure that amounted to, on average, about 18 months. This is a novel finding that should
stimulate future work on the origins of firm heterogeneity.
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0.10
(0.00)
0.37
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.19)
0.06
(0.00)
0.03
(0.00)
0.11
(0.00)
0.16
(0.00)
-0.06
(0.00)
14568

R&D

patents

wave number

age postIPO

age at IPO

assets

sales

LATE

P-values in parentheses

Observations

0.66
(0.00)

private tech acq

tech acq

tech acq
1.00

-0.09
(0.00)

0.06
(0.00)

0.03
(0.00)

0.01
(0.21)

0.01
(0.28)

-0.04
(0.00)

0.20
(0.00)

0.03
(0.00)

1.00

private acq

-0.02
(0.01)

0.24
(0.00)

0.15
(0.00)

-0.01
(0.12)

-0.10
(0.00)

0.28
(0.00)

0.29
(0.00)

1.00

R&D

0.01
(0.00)

0.23
(0.00)

0.16
(0.00)

0.02
(0.01)

0.06
(0.00)

-0.06
(0.00)

1.00

patents

-0.20
(0.00)

-0.03
(0.00)

0.00
(0.66)

-0.05
(0.00)

-0.45
(0.00)

1.00

wave

0.05
(0.00)

0.12
(0.00)

0.06
(0.00)

0.02
(0.00)

1.00

age

-0.02
(0.01)

-0.04
(0.00)

0.00
(0.82)

1.00

age IPO

0.05
(0.00)

0.63
(0.00)

1.00

assets

0.04
(0.00)

1.00

sales

1.00

LATE

Table 1: Correlation matrix of relevant variables. Consistent with our hypothesis, LATE is negatively correlated with
technological acquisitions

Early environment and innovation strategy Appendix A: Tables
A-1

Early environment and innovation strategy Appendix A: Tables

A-2

Table 2: Descriptive statistics
mean

sd

min

max

technological acquisitions
private technological acquisitions
R&D expenditures ($mill)
wave number
age postIPO
age at IPO
assets
sales
LATE

.950
.935
.589
3.995
13.023
5.811
2,555
1,463
.512

1.140
.656
.988
1.470
5.838
4.065
17477
7866
.499

0
0
0
1
6
1
0
0
0

30
25
7.83
7
34
15
691,063
352,369
1

Observations

14,498

Note: Unit of observation is firm-year

Table 3: Impact of late-wave dummy on number of small tech acquisitions completed between years 5 and 10
post IPO. Incidence ratios on Column 1 show that LATE firms acquire 67.24% as many targets vs early firms.
Column 2 controls for pre-IPO patenting.Including these controls further reduces the ratio to 60.79%, mitigating
the possibility that the differences are driven by pre-IPO technological capabilities. Column 3 shows a slight
attenuation once we include firm-level characteristics such as assets, employees, and sales measured at maturity.
small deals
dummy for late in wave
mean value for DV
incidence ratio
control pre-IPO NPL references
control pre-IPO originality
control pre-IPO generality
control pre-IPO firm characteristics
control post-IPO firm characteristics
NAICS Codes
individual wave dummies
Observations

small deals

small deals

-0.396

-0.498

-0.347

(0.114)

(0.137)

(0.118)

4.183

4.963

4.456

0.672

0.608

0.707

(0.076)

(0.084)

(0.087)

No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
907

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
633

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
633

Unit of observation is the firm.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Results are virtually unchanged
using classical standard errors
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Table 4: This table explores how differences in technological acquisitions between
early and LATE firms persist over time. Column 1 shows the effect for firms up
to five years post-IPO. Using a moving 5-year window, the magnitude of the
negative coefficient on LATE remains fairly constant on Columns 2-5. Incidence
ratios (IRR) are reported and range from 66.92% in years 1-5 to 74.44% in years
15-20. In other words, LATE firms engage in about a third to a quarter fewer
technological acquisitions over the study period. These results provide strong
evidence of long-run persistence for the impact of LATE on future acquisitions.
(1)
top 4tile
yrs 1-5

(2)
top 4tile
yrs 5-10

(3)
top 4tile
yrs 10-15

(4)
top 4tile
yrs 15-20

(5)
top 4tile
yrs 20+

LATE dummy

-0.402
(0.139)

-0.385
(0.151)

-0.335
(0.125)

-0.295
(0.117)

-0.326
(0.158)

incidence ratios

0.669
(0.093)

0.680
(0.097)

0.715
(0.097)

0.744
(0.123)

0.722
(0.186)

ln(age at IPO)

0.147
(0.189)

0.248
(0.233)

-0.018
(0.341)

-0.626
(0.350)

-0.526
(0.424)

ln(age)

-1.538
(0.588)

-2.561
(0.907)

-0.619
(1.541)

2.017
(1.473)

2.682
(1.679)

1st wave

0.000
(.)

0.000
(.)

0.000
(.)

0.000
(.)

0.0000
(.)

2nd wave

-0.193
(0.507)

-0.180
(0.517)

-0.199
(0.585)

-0.200
(0.674)

-0.1706
(0.7120

3rd wave

0.536
(0.362)

0.383
(0.398)

0.680
(0.448)

0.950
(0.570)

1.074
(0.563)

4th wave

0.304
(0.383)

-0.146
(0.484)

0.554
(0.645)

1.448
(0.715)

5th wave

0.024
(0.431)

-0.544
(0.565)

0.535
(0.839)

(0.888)

6th wave

0.109
(0.514)

-0.771
(0.720)

0.518
(1.134)

7th wave

0.217
(0.679)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1211
0.339

-0.198
(0.862)
Yes
Yes
Yes
806
0.386

Yes
Yes
Yes
646
0.476

pre IPO firm chars
post-IPO firm chars
NAICS
Observations
r2

Yes
Yes
Yes
325
0.659

Yes
Yes
Yes
171
0.730

Unit of observation is firm. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity

Results are virtually unchanged using classical standard errors
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Table 5: This table shows the relationship between LATE and patent generality (gen), originality (orig), and non-patent scientific references (NPL). Columns 1-3 show a positive impact
of LATE on all measures. Columns 4-6 include additional controls for assets and R&D expenditures at time of IPO, as well as patent stock in 2013 and dummy for whether the firm
survived. The additional controls marginally strengthen the coefficients and tighten up the
estimated standard errors. This is consistent with the view that results are not driven by
pre-IPO characteristics nor by survival or growth.
(1)
gen
0.033
(0.015)

(2)
orig
0.070
(0.021)

(3)
NPL
0.049
(0.019)

(4)
gen
0.035
(0.013)

(5)
orig
0.072
(0.020)

(6)
NPL
0.060
(0.019)

DV mean value
(effect of LATE on DV)

0.427
(7.73%)

0.614
(11.4%)

0.306
(16.0%)

0.427
(8.20%)

0.614
(11.73%)

0.306
(19.61%)

ln(age at IPO)

-0.007
(0.017)

0.015
(0.020)

0.004
(0.022)

-0.002
(0.018)

0.023
(0.020)

0.013
(0.021)

ln(assets)

-0.005
(0.008)

-0.015
(0.014)

-0.021
(0.011)

-0.003
(0.008)

-0.014
(0.016)

-0.018
(0.012)

ln(R&D spend)

0.008
(0.007)

0.024
(0.014)

0.058
(0.010)

0.003
(0.009)

0.012
(0.014)

0.030
(0.011)

R&D / sales

0.028
(0.041)

0.193
(0.081)

0.214
(0.063)

0.026
(0.038)

0.171
(0.075)

0.156
(0.056)

ln(employees)

-0.028
(0.012)

-0.011
(0.014)

-0.040
(0.016)

-0.036
(0.014)

-0.010
(0.018)

-0.034
(0.015)

ln(patents)

0.013
(0.006)

0.010
(0.008)

-0.009
(0.008)

0.030
(0.010)

0.022
(0.017)

0.000
(0.013)

ln(sales)

-0.021
(0.023)

-0.057
(0.035)

-0.189
(0.033)

-0.011
(0.027)

-0.042
(0.043)

-0.164
(0.036)

surviving in 2013

0.001
(0.021)

0.048
(0.031)

0.064
(0.028)

ln(age 2013)

0.019
(0.011)

-0.001
(0.016)

0.022
(0.018)

ln(assets at IPO)

-0.001
(0.007)

-0.008
(0.011)

-0.014
(0.009)

ln(R&D spend at IPO)

0.015
(0.007)

0.021
(0.011)

0.038
(0.008)

ln(patent stock 2013)

-0.026
(0.009)
Yes
Yes
182,446
0.119

-0.021
(0.018)
Yes
Yes
242,348
0.071

-0.021
(0.015)
Yes
Yes
241,952
0.084

LATE dummy

NAICS
year dummies
Observations
r2

Yes
Yes
192,648
0.111

Yes
Yes
255,895
0.068

Yes
Yes
255,468
0.079

Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. OLS regressions.
For binary dependent variable in models 3 and 6, results are robust to Probit specification.
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Table 6: This table shows the relationship between time to wave-end and patent generality
(gen), originality (orig), and non-patent scientific references (NPL). These are the same
specifications as Table 5, replacing the DV with the count of months between IPO and end
of wave. All the results are similar to Table 5. However, interpreting the coefficients is
less-straightforward. Given that the average wave lasts 18 months, one potential way to
conceptualize the impact is to multiply the percentage (monthly effect) coefficients by 18.
Importantly, this yields results that are very similar in magnitude as those shown in Table
5.
(1)
gen
-0.001
(0.001)
0.427
(0.24%)

(2)
orig
-0.002
(0.001)
0.614
(0.33%)

(3)
NPL
-0.002
(0.001)
0.306
(0.65%)

(4)
gen
-0.002
(0.001)
0.427
(0.47%)

(5)
orig
-0.003
(0.001)
0.614
(0.49%)

(6)
NPL
-0.003
(0.001)
0.306
(1.0%)

ln(age at IPO)

-0.007
(0.018)

0.009
(0.021)

-0.002
(0.025)

0.002
(0.018)

0.024
(0.020)

0.017
(0.021)

ln(assets)

-0.005
(0.008)

-0.012
(0.015)

-0.016
(0.012)

-0.004
(0.008)

-0.017
(0.017)

-0.021
(0.013)

ln(R&D spend)

0.008
(0.007)

0.029
(0.018)

0.065
(0.012)

0.003
(0.009)

0.014
(0.015)

0.031
(0.012)

R&D / sales

0.038
(0.042)

0.233
(0.082)

0.258
(0.069)

0.032
(0.039)

0.185
(0.076)

0.166
(0.058)

ln(employees)

-0.027
(0.013)

-0.010
(0.016)

-0.041
(0.018)

-0.036
(0.014)

-0.009
(0.019)

-0.033
(0.015)

ln(patents)

0.011
(0.006)

-0.002
(0.010)

-0.024
(0.010)

0.031
(0.010)

0.023
(0.018)

0.002
(0.014)

ln(sales)

-0.020
(0.024)

-0.058
(0.040)

-0.192
(0.040)

-0.011
(0.027)

-0.040
(0.045)

-0.165
(0.038)

ln(age)

0.019
(0.012)

-0.003
(0.017)

0.021
(0.018)

ln(assets at IPO)

-0.001
(0.007)

-0.007
(0.011)

-0.013
(0.009)

ln(R&D spend at IPO)

0.015
(0.007)

0.020
(0.012)

0.038
(0.009)

ln(patent stock 2013)

-0.028
(0.009)

-0.023
(0.019)

-0.023
(0.016)

surviving in 2013

0.003
(0.021)
182445
0.119

0.053
(0.033)
242343
0.069

0.069
(0.030)
241947
0.084

distance
DV mean value
(effect/month on DV)

Observations
r2

192646
0.110

255889
0.061

255462
0.074

Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. OLS regressions.
For binary dependent variable in models 3 and 6, results are robust to Probit specification.
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Table 7: This table shows the impact of the LATE dummy on the characteristics of top
management. The dependent variable is a count of how many top managers had either an
MBA (Column 1) or a PhD in a scientific field (Column 2), for firms between 5 and 10 years
of age as of 2013. Data limitations prevent me from observing educational background
across moving windows, as in the acquisition analysis. Coefficient estimates for negative
binomial regressions are exponentiated and reported here as incidence ratios. For managers
of a given type (MBA or PhD), incidence ratios reported can be interpreted as the ratio
of (count of managers for early firms)/(count of managers for late firms). Column 1 shows
that LATE firms have only 33.4% as many MBA managers relative to early firms. On the
other hand, Column 2 shows that LATE firms have a 34.7% more managers with a science
or engineering PhD relative to early firms.
count of MBA mgrs
(1)
LATE dummy

count of PhD mgr
(2)

0.333
(0.140)

LATE dummy

1.347
(0.192)

control pre/post-IPO firm characteristics

Yes

Yes

IPC Codes

Yes

Yes

NAICS Codes

Yes

Yes

individual wave dummies
Observations

Yes
274

Yes
274

Unit of observation is the firm.
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratios).
Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity

Results are virtually unchanged using classical standard errors

.
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Table 8: Probit test for selection into treatment group: Do pre-IPO nonpatent references, originality and generality measures predict dummy for
late in wave? Despite the quasi-experimental setting, it is possible that
some firms self-select to go early or LATE. This might driving the relationship between LATE firms and their differences in patenting and M&A. To
mitigate this concern, I run Probit tests to see whether the type of research
performed by the firms prior to IPO predicts the sorting into early or LATE.
I use average originality, generality and non-patent citations for the stock of
patents of firms pre-IPO. These are widely accepted proxies for quality of
research, and if firms are less research intensive before IPO, it would make
sense that they are more acquisitive and less research intensive after IPO.
Pre-IPO firm characteristics include M&A experience and intention dummies from S-1 fillings. The table shows that none of the measures of research
quality are significantly correlated with the LATE dummy. This suggests
that firms’ pre-IPO patenting was not systematically different between early
and LATE firms.
.
(1)
NPL share pre-IPO

Prob(late=1)
(2)

.
(3)

-0.353
(0.532)

firm-level average originaltiy pre-IPO

0.727
(0.571)

firm-level average generality pre-IPO

0.617
(0.425)

control pre-IPO firm characteristics

Yes

Yes

Yes

IPC Codes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NAICS Codes

Yes

Yes

Yes

individual wave dummies
Observations

Yes
368

Yes
302

Yes
291

Unit of observation is the firm.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 1: This figure shows a stylized depiction of the shift in technological orientation documented in prior literature (e.g. (Bernstein, 2014).

Figure 2: This figure shows a stylized depiction of the predicted differential shift in technological
orientation: If firms late to the cycle have fewer options to acquire, they may compensate by
investing in internal R%D, leading them down a different trajectory.

Figure 3: This figure illustrates the high degree of correlation between IPO waves and intensity
of technological acquisitions, as observed during the 1999-2000 wave. Importantly, both IPO
and acquisitions end sharply and almost at the same time. The horizontal axis shows months,
and the vertical axis shows number of IPO and technological acquisitions.
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Figure 4: Hypothetical firms “Early” and “Late!” are coded LATE =0 (control) and LATE =1
(treatment) respectively, based on the timing of their IPO relative to midpoint wave. DV
compares the count of technological acquisitions between treatment and control groups. The
regressions look at moving 5-year windows at 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20 years post-IPO (shown here
are the two different measurement windows for each firm in their years 5-10 ). We expect treated
(LATE ) firms to engage in fewer acquisitions in the long-run.

Figure 5: This chart shows the change in share of external patents held by all firms in the sample.
We can see that on average, early firms increased their technological acquisitions sharply after
IPO, whereas LATE firms did not. Horizontal axis spans from 75 months prior to IPO to 77
months after IPO. The plots are jagged because the underlying data is a mix of monthly and
yearly observations.
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Coding Pre-IPO SEC Registration Forms

In this study we are interested in disentangling the role of the environment from the role
of founder effects, or similar unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, we pay special attention one of
the most consistent and reliable sources of information available that gives us a window into
the characteristics of the pre-IPO firms: their registration forms. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) stipulates that any firm undertaking an IPO in the United States must
provide details about the issuing company, its financials, a statement of its intended use of IPO
proceeds, and background information for its officers and board members.
This is most often via a registration statement S-1 which that includes the firms prospectus.12 However, firms with less than $25 million in revenues can use Form SB-2. We omit
from our analysis the smallest offerings, raising less than $5 million, as these are almost never
traded on major exchanges (due to high administration and compliance costs of exchanges like
NASDAQ). These small offerings would use Form A. 13 For ease of exposition, we refer to all
registration forms as “S-1”, as these are the most frequently used ones. This is consistent with
prior literature.
1. Explicit M&A Experience (categorical variable):
We read S-1 filing for mentions that the company has previously acquired other technologies
or companies. This type of information is usually in the Company or Overview section. We
code this variable as 1 if we find explicit mentions of M&A, for example: “In [year] we acquired
[company X].” Another possible place is the Financials section where they may report financial
information related to an acquisition. We look for any mentions such as: “... expenses from
acquisition of [company X]” or similar statements. We find that 32% of firms state having had
M&A experience prior to IPO.
Examples:
“We do, however, expect that product revenues will increase in the near term as a result of
our acquisition of [company X] on September 30, 2005”
“The acquisition of [company X] is consistent with our strategy to transition our revenues
mix from contract research revenues to product sales and license revenues.”
“22,745 shares of common stock issued or reserved for issuance in connection with the acquisition of [company X] that were held in escrow on that date, and 429 shares of common stock
issuable upon the exercise of warrants at an exercise price of $21.06 per share held in escrow as
of that date.”
12
13

https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-1.pdf
See Certo et al. (2009) for an overview of IPO research in management and entrepreneurship.
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2. Soft Intention to Acquire (categorical variable):
We look in the Use of Proceeds section. There is both a summary and a full description of
what the IPO proceeds are anticipated to fund. We code this variable as 1 if the filling states
that the firm “intends” or “may use” the proceeds to fund acquisitions of “complementary” or
any other businesses/technologies. This is a frequent statement, and is used by most firms. It
does not so much express an express intention or interest in acquiring, as much as it connotes
being open to the possibility. We can interpret this as indication that firms that do not include
such statement may be predisposed against acquisitions. In all, 69% of firms state this level of
“open mindedness” about potential acquisitions.
Examples (bold added for emphasis):
- “We intend to use the net proceeds from this offering for working capital and other general
corporate purposes, including to finance our growth, develop new products, assert and defend
our intellectual property rights, and fund capital expenditures. In addition, we may choose
to repay our loan facility with Silicon Valley Bank or expand our current business
through the acquisitions of other businesses, products, or technologies.
- “We may also use a portion of the net proceeds to us to expand our current business
through strategic alliances with, or acquisitions of, other businesses, products, intellectual properties or technologies. We currently have no agreements or commitments for
any acquisitions at this time.”
3. Explicit Intention to Acquire as Part of Strategy (categorical variable):
This is the strongest indication of the firms intentions to acquire. We find that 25% of firms
have made made a definitive and/or specific statement of their intention to acquire. In many
cases a specific target or technology is mentioned.
Examples (bold added for emphasis):
- “Selective Acquisition Strategy. We selectively pursue the acquisition of proprietary aerospace component businesses when we see a clear path to create value through the
application of our three core value-driven operating strategies... We have established a dedicated
acquisition effort to identify, approach and evaluate potential acquisition targets. We also have
significant experience among our management team in executing acquisitions and integrating acquired operations, having successfully acquired and integrated fifteen businesses and/or product
lives since our formation in 1993.
- “Pursue strategic acquisitions and alliances: We intend to selectively pursue acquisitions
and alliances in the future that will provide us with new or complementary technologies, personnel with significant relevant experience, or increased market penetration. We are currently
evaluating a number of possible acquisitions or strategic relationships and believe that our resources and experience make us an attractive acquiror or partner.”

